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1        Introduction 
 
This interview has been long in the making: we started it on the 6th of 
February 2017. I met Murray in his office at the University of Kent, 
and we spent an intense but pleasant afternoon drinking coffee and 
talking film, art, and aesthetics. In preparation for the interview, I 
sent Murray a list of questions I wanted to discuss with him; but, in 
all honesty, I only managed to get through a third of all the questions 
I had in mind, and that’s because the conversation developed in ways 
I didn’t anticipate, and brought new questions to the table. So, our 
initial plan for the conversation looked like a jazz score, with some 
general indications, but with room for improvisation. Ironically, 
despite having taught with him on his undergraduate module ‘Sound 
and Cinema’, among the things I didn’t manage to ask Murray were 
things about his work on film sound and music.1  
  Since our meeting, we have been in contact via email, editing 
the interview. As a result, the fruits of our improvisation have been 
manipulated in post-production, and what you see here is an edited 
version of our conversation rather than just a transcript of the 
recording. At the time of our meeting, ‘Film, Art, and the Third 
Culture’ (‘FACT’)2 was about to be published, so a large chunk of this 
interview is devoted to an analysis of the main arguments presented 
in that book. Indeed the relationship between aesthetics and science 
 
1 Smith 2002, 2006b.  
2 Jerrold Levinson’s ‘poetically licensed’ acronym for Smith 2017a, in Levinson 2018b 
(‘FACT is a Fact of Both Art and Life’). Levinson’s paper also appears in slightly 
modified form as a review, Levinson 2018a. 
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is the central theme of the interview, as this relationship remains 
relevant even when considering topics that have long been among 
Murray’s research interests, such as the role of empathy and 
emotions in our engagement with films. We have amended the 
tenses of a few sentences: on the occasion of the original interview, 
Murray referred to the twentieth anniversary of the first Society for 
Cognitive Studies of the Moving Image conference as a future event, 
but as it is now squarely in the rear view mirror, you will read about 
the conference in the past tense. In addition, Murray held a Laurance 
S. Rockefeller Fellowship at Princeton University’s Center for Human 
Values for 2017–18, and during the editing of the interview he added 
some hints of his project there. 
The first section of the interview, ‘Aesthetics Naturalised’, is 
an introduction to ‘FACT’, as we talk about the aims of the book and 
the story behind it. In the second section, ‘Aesthetic Experience 
Triangulated’, we delve deeper into the arguments that bind together 
science and the study of art and aesthetics—in particular, we clarify 
the role the hard sciences may play in the study of aesthetic 
experience. In the third section, ‘Spectatorship’, I ask Murray to 
reappraise his first—and extremely influential—monograph, 
'Engaging Characters’ (‘EC’), in light of his latest work.3 In this 
section, Murray also shows how a naturalised account of aesthetic 
experience may help provide a solution to the paradox of horror and 
the paradox of fiction. In the final section, ‘Film and/as Philosophy’, 
Murray clarifies his viewpoint on the relationship between film and 
philosophy, and ends with advice for young academics working in 







3 Smith 1995a (revised edition forthcoming 2020).  
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2        Aesthetics Naturalised 
 
Angelo Cioffi: Let me start with your most recent book, ‘Film, Art, 
and the Third Culture’. What is the ‘third culture’ you refer to in the 
book’s title? 
Murray Smith: The idea comes from a debate that was initiated in 
the late 1950s by C.P. Snow, who was a Cambridge physicist, but also 
a novelist, as well as a government minister for a period. So, he was a 
kind of a polymath figure. Snow wrote an essay—“The Two 
Cultures”—and delivered a version of it as a lecture in 1959.4 Snow’s 
essay was essentially a complaint that, as he put it, the culture of the 
sciences—by which he meant the natural sciences—and what he 
called ‘literary intellectuals’—that was his expression, but really that 
was a stand-in for the humanities as a whole—were moving apart 
from one another, that there was a widening gulf between those two 
domains of intellectual life, those two parts of the academy. So, that 
became known as the ‘two cultures debate’. The ‘two cultures’ is 
really a very central debate in the public sphere throughout the 
1960s, petering out in the 1970s. Now, within that debate, Snow uses 
the expression the ‘third culture’ at one point in his essay, as a way of 
referring to a kind of intellectual culture that transcended the two 
cultures. The ‘Third Culture’ of the title of my book, then, refers to 
that ideal, the ideal of not being bound into an intellectual culture 
that sees a simple and rigid divide between what we do in the 
humanities and what we do in the sciences.  
That is where the ‘Third Culture’ phrase originally comes 
from, and it has been picked up before, so I’m not the first 
subsequent author to adopt the phrase and the idea of a third 
culture. In particular, it was used by John Brockman (the well-known 
founder of the ‘Edge’ website). Brockman is a sort of intellectual 
 
4 The first published piece by Snow on this theme appeared in 1956. Generally 
speaking, though, the start of this debate is dated from 1959, when Snow delivered 
a revised and expanded version of his essay as the Rede Lecture at Cambridge. 
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entrepreneur, who works with high-profile, mostly scientific 
academics. In the mid-nineties Brockman published a book called 
‘The Third Culture’, which was a large collection of interviews with 
figures like Steven Pinker, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and 
others of that ilk.5 Now, with that venture Brockman is doing 
something a little different to what I am doing with the idea of the 
third culture. What Brockman is really interested in are scientists 
who are willing and feel able to speak about questions and issues that 
are traditionally dealt with by the humanities. For example, 
evolutionary theorists, who have things to say about how culture 
works; along with the figures I’ve mentioned, Lynn Margulis and 
Stephen Jay Gould also appear in the book. So, in Brockman’s version 
of the third culture, the humanities do not have much of a role to 
play; the idea is that certain scientific disciplines are now sufficiently 
well developed, they now have enough momentum, so that they can 
begin to say things about culture without reference to traditional 
debates. So, that’s Brockman’s version of the third culture, where, so 
to speak, the humanities are swallowed up by the machine of 
science. My version is, I would say, more interdisciplinary, arguing 
not that we can or should jettison all of the traditional techniques 
that have been developed in the humanities over decades—indeed, 
centuries—but that we should complement them and integrate 
them with the knowledge and methods that come out of science.  
Let me try to round off the answer to this first question: I am 
saying that there are at least these two ways in which the idea of the 
third culture has been adopted. One way is the Brockman version, in 
which science colonises the territory of the humanities, and the other 
one is mine, which suggests that it is a fruitful project to try to 
integrate the traditions of humanistic and scientific methods. 
 
AC: The book is mainly focused on aesthetics, but do you think that 
an integration of humanistic and scientific methods can also be 
fruitful in other domains of knowledge?  
 
5 Brockman 1995.  
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MS: I am focused on aesthetic questions, but the aesthetic questions 
are usually a narrower form, a specific form, of a broader question. 
Now of course, the more specific question will often bring very 
particular things into play, but I still think, in general, that a lot of the 
arguments that are specifically about aesthetics in the book will have 
an echo in other domains, at a high level. So, to take a quick example, 
one could adopt a third cultural perspective on morality. And I am 
not talking about morality just as it enters aesthetic experience—
that is, the debate about the relationship between aesthetic and 
ethical value. Let’s just say we want to understand ethics and 
morality on their own terms. And that’s our primary focus. There is a 
whole approach to ethics and morality, parallel to the third cultural 
approach to aesthetics, which treats them as part of our evolved, 
natural behaviour, perfectly amenable to scientific enquiry.  
 
AC: This would include the work of Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Prinz, 
for example? 
 
MS: Indeed. As a general rule, to answer your question, yes, the focus 
in this book is clearly on aesthetics but in many, many ways this is a 
version of an argument that can be run with respect to other specific 
domains. And I have to say that this was one of the challenges in 
writing the book, that a lot of the time what I am trying to digest and 
distil is an understanding of some more general area. For example, 
empathy is not a uniquely aesthetic phenomenon, right? So, the task 
is, number one, let’s understand empathy as a general phenomenon, 
and of course that is a very complex and controversial area on its 
own terms. And let us understand it in a naturalised spirit—that is, 
against the backdrop of relevant scientific knowledge; that’s the 
second part of the task. And then when all of that’s done, let’s think 
about how all of this has implications for the aesthetic deployment of 
empathy.  
 So, I suppose that is a feature of the way I approach 
aesthetics—that at every moment I am trying to say, aesthetics is a 
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particular thing; I am not one of those theorists or philosophers who 
think that aesthetics has been eliminated from our theoretical 
vocabulary, and that somehow it is just an archaic concept. I think it 
still picks out something fundamental and real in our experience. But 
part of the naturalised approach to it involves saying that it is not 
something inexplicable, something mysteriously distinct from 
ordinary forms of emotional response or experience. It is particular, 
but not mysterious; distinctive, but not ineffable. So that is why there 
is always an effort to relate what is going on in the domain of 
aesthetics with kindred things that happen in other parts of our lives. 
Another example, I guess, would be suspense. We might think of 
suspense as something we mostly experience in artistic and aesthetic 
contexts—in relation to narratives. But it wouldn’t be weird to talk 
about being in a state of suspense in an ordinary context, when you 
are waiting for some important result that is about to come through 
and you are hopeful but fearful about what the outcome is going to 
be. That is at least very much akin to what we call suspense. So there 
again, I think we have a relationship between something that seems 
to be especially relevant in the domain of aesthetic experience but is 
connected with ordinary experience. One of the principles or general 
strategies of the book—and I can’t remember if I talk about it 
(laughs) but it strikes me talking to you now—is that that is another 
way in which aesthetic questions can be made as concrete and as 
naturalistically tractable as possible.  
  
AC: Your response echoes the subtitle of your book, which sounds 
more specialist than the main title: ‘A Naturalized Aesthetics of Film’. 
Perhaps this can be taken as a statement of purpose: what is the aim 
of the book?  
 
MS: I probably should have given the book a subtitle more like 
‘towards a naturalized aesthetics of film’ (laughs), because one thing 
that is certainly true of this project is that, you know, every time I 
would do a spell of work on it, I felt that as the clouds cleared, the 
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mountain range that I’d set out to climb seemed to get ever higher. If 
ever there was a project where eventually I reached the point where 
it was a case of—“this is either going to drive me insane, or I am 
going to die before I complete this project. So I have to find a way of 
wrapping up what I have discovered at this point”—this is that 
project. And that is why I say maybe it should be called ‘towards a 
naturalized aesthetics of film’, because to realise the project in its full 
form is not a project for one person. It’s really a research programme, 
meaning it is a proposal for a whole different way of approaching 
film in particular, and aesthetics in general, which, if it has a 
justification—if it is a worthwhile endeavour—it is not for one 
person alone to realise. Another way of putting this would be to say 
that what the book tries to be is not so much a realisation of the 
research programme as a kind of philosophical defence of a research 
programme that I think is already coming into being. I am not 
inventing naturalised aesthetics, but rather recognising something 
that I think has happened around me across my academic career. I 
have been part of it, but just a part of it. So the book is an attempt to 
recognise what that thing has been and to give it some shape and to 
justify it. And when I say ‘justify it’ I mean also to try and identify its 
limits, its character, what it can do, what it can’t do, what it can claim 
to do.  
 
AC: And the expression ‘naturalised aesthetics’, where does that 
come from? 
 
MS: I am not sure how far it goes back. It probably goes back many 
decades, but however far it goes back I think its origin must be as an 
echo of an expression used by the philosopher W.V.O. Quine, in a 
famous essay from the late 1960s called ‘Epistemology Naturalized’. 
According to Quine, knowledge is an empirical phenomenon, 
amenable to scientific—and in particular psychological—enquiry. 
Quine writes: “Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into 
place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It 
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studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject”.6 
‘Naturalism’ had been a term of art in philosophy for many decades 
before that—it goes back at least to the early twentieth century. But 
Quine’s work in general, and that essay in particular, was certainly an 
important landmark and polemical moment in suggesting how far 
the claims for a naturalistic approach to philosophy could be pushed. 
So, a couple of decades later you begin to hear aestheticians talking 
about naturalised aesthetics as an echo of naturalised epistemology. 
That is part of the explanation of the subtitle and the story of the 
book.  
 
 AC: And what actually is a ‘naturalised aesthetics’?  
 
MS: One important thing that I talk about at the beginning of the 
book is that naturalism, for most people in the humanities—not 
philosophers, but just about anyone else in the humanities—would 
usually be understood as referring to an artistic style or a tradition of 
art; if we think of the novel it’s going to be Zola, or Dreiser in an 
American context. Or a filmmaker like Ken Loach maybe. It’s related 
to realism … naturalism has some particular nuances, but it is about 
rigorously capturing the way the world actually is. That is what 
people understand by ‘naturalism’ in the context of art and art 
theory. However, in philosophy, naturalism really picks out 
something quite distinct. There might be interesting connections to 
make between naturalism as a philosophical stance and naturalism 
as a style of art (though I do not make these connections in the 
book). So, what does naturalism mean philosophically? Naturalism 
essentially means an approach to philosophical questions that says 
that the methods of the sciences have been the most successful 
knowledge-generating approach to the world that we have invented, 
and it therefore behoves us, when we think about any question at all, 
to approach that question against the backdrop of a scientific 
 
6 Quine 1969, p. 82. 
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understanding of the world. Now that is quite a broad definition, so 
again to restate it very simply, naturalism is a stance in philosophy 
that is oriented towards a scientific approach to the world.  
To take what is going to seem like an absurd example, but 
just to pump some intuitions about why this would be an attractive 
and indeed an important way of proceeding: if I put forward some 
kind of theory that seems to rely on the idea that the world is flat, or 
disregards the fact that for many centuries now we have had an 
understanding of the topography of the earth which holds that it is 
spherical, people would think that I am crazy, because I would be 
flouting a pretty fundamental and almost universally shared item of 
knowledge about the world. So, you could think of naturalism as if it 
was basically generalising over that principle. If this example strikes 
people as plausible, the principle is: you should at least seek to make 
any theory you have about a specific aspect of the world not conflict 
with firmly established knowledge that is already in place about the 
world in general. That is a broad-brush idea of what naturalism is.  
Let me say a couple more things here. First of all, there is a 
strong parallel between naturalism in philosophy and the third 
culture proposal. Really the main title and the subtitle of the book 
are doing exactly the same thing. The main title is using an idiom 
which has been used in the public sphere, is a little better known and 
which tries to flag up the relevance of the two cultures debate, and 
the idea of a third culture, for some major academic and intellectual 
debates of the last fifty years. The subtitle is pointing us towards a 
more localised debate in philosophy, but a very central debate, which 
I think is essentially the same or very closely-related to the two 
cultures debate. What these two ideas—the naturalistic stance in 
philosophy, and the third culture—share is a focus on the question: 
what is the purview of science? How much weight should we put on 
scientific knowledge and scientific method when we seek to 
understand the world as a whole? Are there domains of experience 
where, so to speak, we put science on the backburner and we just 
proceed without it, or is that a mistake? Within philosophy, there are 
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approaches which one can think of as non-naturalistic, which hold 
that there are certain domains of enquiry, including aesthetics, 
including morality, where science has no grip, because the 
phenomena are not apt for scientific enquiry. That’s the non-
naturalistic perspective. So, the main title of the book and the 
subtitle are mainly echoes of one another, but addressed to slightly 
different audiences. One thing I am trying to do is to put these things 
together, to show how they are related. I think this is part of the role 
of philosophy—as Wilfrid Sellars famously put it, “to understand 
how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together 
in the broadest possible sense of the term”.7 
 
AC: Well, then let me ask you, what is the role of philosophy in the 
context of naturalised aesthetics? What role can philosophy play in 
the analysis of, say, our aesthetic experience of films, given that such 
an approach seems to put so much weight on science? In other 
words, what is left for us? 
 
MS: One thing philosophy can and does bring to the table is a kind of 
synthetic approach, whereby what you are looking to do is connect 
the insights of a broad range of disciplines. So, it is a feature of the 
modern intellectual world that it is increasingly specialised. We all 
talk about interdisciplinarity, but what we don’t say is “hey, why 
don’t we just merge film studies and media studies and cultural 
studies, why do we not just merge them all?”. On the contrary, things 
always generally tend towards further sub-specialisation rather than 
the merging of fields towards more unified and larger academic 
disciplines. So, one of the jobs for this ancient breed we call ‘the 
philosopher’ is to look for the underlying shared principles across 
apparently disparate domains and different academic disciplines, but 
also for points of conflict and incoherence which may go unnoticed 
unless somebody is charged with looking for these things. This takes 
 
7 Sellars 1962, p. 37. The passage is used as an epigraph for Chapter 1, and is 
discussed on p. 21, of Smith 2017a. 
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us back to the passage from Sellars I mentioned a moment ago, 
which I think is a beautiful expression of what makes philosophy 
different from any branch of empirical enquiry. So, I suppose, though 
I haven’t really thought to put a description of the book in these 
terms before, you can think of what I am doing in the book in that 
spirit, in the way I am trying to talk about both evolutionary theory 
and neuroscience. It is not a discovery that these two areas of 
research are somehow related, but it is true that they are both very 
specialised disciplines, and each of them is broken down into sub-
disciplines. Thus, I think there is a job to be done—to say ok, we’ve 
got these two trends in the sciences, and it is true for both 
neuroscience and evolutionary theory that these are areas where 
many of the participants are very interested in making statements 
about how their research has relevance for the way culture works. So, 
I think that there is a task to be done there. We have these trends, we 
have these bodies of scientific research which have these ambitions, 
let us try and sort out what is going on here, let us see how these 
things relate to one another and in turn how it all relates to the kinds 
of traditional work that we do in aesthetics and in other domains like 
the one I originally come from—film studies—which take as their 
foci particular artforms.  
 
AC: Before we delve into the theoretical standpoints you develop in 
the book, I would like to ask you about the story of the book itself:  
why did you decide to write this book, and how did you develop the 
project?  
 
MS: I was in graduate school in Film, in Madison, Wisconsin, from 
1985–91. In that particular department, it wasn’t regarded as unusual 
… but let’s put it positively: it was regarded as a perfectly respectable 
research project which took as part of its methodology that it would 
engage with scientific, generally, and specifically psychological, 
research. This was the moment when David Bordwell was really 
launching the research programme which became known as 
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cognitive film theory. I should note that David had some forerunners, 
so he wasn’t exactly the first person to have had that notion, but he 
was really the person that put everything together in some crucial 
books and essays in that period. So, from a sociological point of view, 
he was the person with both the institutional and the intellectual 
power to bring things together in a sufficiently cogent way that he 
was able to make a dent in the way film was studied; and he achieved 
that partly through his graduate students, including me. So, what I 
am getting at is that through David and through some other people, 
an intellectual climate was created—at least where I was based … 
let’s call it a micro-climate (laughs), though I am not sure how far I 
recognised it was only a micro-climate! —a climate in which you 
could freely engage in what I am now calling a naturalistic approach 
to aesthetics, and film in particular or, alternatively, a third cultural 
approach. Though I wouldn’t have used these expressions at the 
time. That was the period when I wrote my doctoral thesis on 
character, which would become ‘Engaging Characters’. It’ll be evident 
to anyone who reads that book reasonably closely that it draws quite 
extensively on cognitive science, psychology, and other empirical 
domains, for example anthropology.  
So, that was that period, and that was that project; and then I was 
released from Madison, back into the wider academic world, and in 
particular I came back to Britain. I was brought up short by the fact 
that the intellectual micro-climate that I had been living in for 
several years really was a very different climate to the one that I 
returned to in Britain and, in general, I guess I came up against the 
fact that much of the humanities was still either actively hostile to 
the interventions by scientists into humanistic questions or, if not 
actively hostile, it was indifferent to a naturalistic approach, not 
interested in it. But whichever of those terms you use, the point was: 
I came up against the fact that the ground was a lot less fertile for the 
kind of approach that I had been schooled in, at graduate school, 
than I had anticipated. I have only gradually come to this realisation, 
but to some extent ‘FACT’ is the culmination of a very long 
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experience lasting some twenty-five years, the first phase of which 
was the period of research in graduate school which concluded with 
the book ‘EC’. That phase involved an unself-conscious immersion 
into what I can now call a naturalistic approach to those questions. 
And although ‘EC’ has been successful enough—it has its fans as well 
as its detractors (laughs)—in spite of all of that I felt a pressing need, 
which maybe grew as the years went by, to offer a kind of defence 
and justification of what I had mostly taken for granted at the time 
that I was working on that first book. So, that’s the broad story of the 
new book, which is to say that it is a self-conscious justification of a 
kind of approach to research and to aesthetics in particular, which I 
adopted really early on in my career but have increasingly felt the 
need to spell out and justify for my own sake, but also as a project of 
independent value.  
 
AC: During these years, do you think this method has been spreading 
in film studies or aesthetics in particular?  
 
MS: I think to some extent it has. Take a couple of symptoms: again 
around the late 80s, early 90s, you see cognitive film theory gradually 
coming into being as a new approach to the study of film and it 
begins to create various institutional structures, one of the more 
important of which has been SCSMI.8 Now, that’s still quite a 
modestly-sized academic society, but it has been around now for 
about 20 years (in fact 2017 was the twentieth anniversary of the first 
ever meeting of the society). So, I would say that it has grown to some 
degree, it has consolidated itself and there are parallel developments 
in literary studies, for example, but I wouldn’t say it has massively 
spread. I don’t think you can claim that there’s been exponential 
growth year on year. Indeed, if there had been exponential growth, 
by now we would be talking about naturalised aesthetics being the 
dominant approach, and it just clearly isn’t. And it’s the same with 
 
8 The Society for Cognitive Studies of the Moving Image. Murray is a founding 
advisory board member of SCSMI, and served as its President from 2014-17. 
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cognitive film theory—it is still a minority approach, albeit a 
significant one.  
 
AC: Whatever the current, actual state of affairs, though, yours is still 
a normative claim, right? That is, you think this is how aesthetics 
should be done?  
MS: … Well … Yes. (laughs) I mean, I would need to say more about 
how the approach I am talking about fits into the broader scope of 
aesthetics. I was saying earlier that the project is a defence and a 
justification of naturalised aesthetics, but part of that is about 
delimiting it, right? So it’s not like I want to say: “this method will 
answer every single question you might have about a work of art, or 
an experience of natural beauty, and is your one-stop shop or all-
encompassing solution”. But to come back to your question about it 
being a normative claim: yes, it is a normative claim, so I agree with 
you there, but what that normative claim is, I may want to spell out a 
bit more carefully. You know the claim would be: for certain kinds of 
questions, which I think are central questions, the naturalised 
method is the best, and, you might even say, the only respectable 
method. But there might be other questions that people can 
legitimately ask, where naturalism does not have any claim to be 
necessarily the best approach to take.  
 
AC: Do you have an example of one of these questions? 
  
MS: I think that if you are talking about the aesthetic evaluation of a 
single work, it is not that I think that you cannot learn anything from 
a naturalised approach to aesthetics, but it is going to be very 
indirect. So, those are the kinds of questions, which I think are going 
to be the most remote from the method I am talking about, and in 
general, I am very wary of suggesting that a naturalised approach can 
answer evaluative questions, normative questions. Because in order 
to be a scientifically oriented and informed method, it has to hold 
evaluation and judgement at bay. You can’t allow preferences and 
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judgements of that sort to start colouring the answers you give to 
what you are posing as empirical questions. How would I like it to 
turn out to be? That’s the whole point about science: it tries to 
bracket all of those evaluative questions in order to accurately 
describe and explain the world. So, I don’t think a naturalistic 
philosopher can have it both ways. You can’t say that this is the 
strength of this approach to philosophy and then also say, “and it can 
answer all these normative questions”, because the normative 
questions have a different character.  
 
AC: Let me get back to something you said earlier about naturalism 
as requiring a scientific approach to the world. In your book, you 
mark a difference between scientific knowledge and scientific 
method. How is this difference relevant to naturalism?9 
 
MS: I don’t think that distinction is registered often enough. There’s 
an important difference between taking note of what science seems 
to have discovered about the world (scientific knowledge), and how 
science goes about investigating the world (scientific method). 
I suppose the way to look at it is this: I would say the first 
obligation for a naturalistically-inclined researcher is to think about 
how the question they are posing, the kind of evidence they are 
drawing upon, the conclusions they are reaching … how these sit 
against the backdrop of already recognised knowledge of the world, 
much of which would be scientific knowledge of the world. Now this 
does not mean we ought to slavishly follow current scientific 
orthodoxy, because of course what science tells us about the world 
often changes. One-decade butter is bad for you, the next decade it 
might be good for you after all (laughs). But taking account of 
current, relevant scientific wisdom is a kind of pressure or a 
constraint. That does not yet imply that we are obliged to adopt 
scientific methods, however. It is a further step for a naturalistically-
 
9 Smith 2017a, pp. 24-37. 
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inclined researcher not only to be vigilant and aware of the best 
scientific knowledge relevant to their inquiry, but to adopt scientific 
methods. 
To narrow the claim down a bit, what I am saying is: if you 
identify yourself as a naturalistic philosopher, the first thing you do is 
to be vigilant about your background assumptions concerning 
whatever domain you are doing research in. So, if you are asking 
questions about, let us say, empathy in relation to film viewing, I am 
not going to reach for some arcane theory which may no longer stand 
as an accepted theory of mind, and think that that is a perfectly 
legitimate thing to do. I am going to feel some obligation to orient my 
enquiry to what are regarded as reasonably well-established ideas 
about the mind. So that is the softer constraint, that is ‘naturalism 
101’. ‘Naturalism 301’ is when you start to say, “well, we might be 
philosophers but, insofar as there is an empirical aspect to the 
question we are asking, maybe we should actually get our feet wet 
and engage in some data-gathering”.10 That’s where you are beginning 
to adopt the scientific method. The fashionable name for that trend 
in philosophy is XPhi, Experimental Philosophy. And there are small 
subsets of aestheticians who are doing experiments. So that is well 
established. I should add that I am only on the cusp of really doing 
that myself, in other words, collaborating with scientists to run 
experiments; I have done a little bit on it with eye tracking and I 
might be doing some more with Vittorio Gallese in relation to 
suspense, using EEG techniques … But again, to characterise ‘FACT’ 
correctly, the book cannot lay claim to what I am calling ‘naturalism 
301’ (laughs).  
So, that hopefully gives you an idea of why there is an 
important difference between scientific knowledge and method. A 
really humdrum example I use in the book concerns painkilling 
drugs. We all walk around with what we take to be reasonably 
reliable knowledge about how painkillers work. Now painkillers are 
 
10American terminology: 101 is the most elementary course in an academic 
programme, 301 is a more advanced course, 501 still more advanced, and so on. 
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absolutely a product of the modern scientific medical world, but as 
lay individuals, we haven’t used scientific methods to prove to 
ourselves that ibuprofen and paracetamol work the way that we take 
them to; we’ve just accepted this knowledge because we live in a 
scientifically-informed society, which embeds, so to speak, scientific 
knowledge in so many of its technologies and structures. Like it or 
not, we’re already implicated in a lot of scientific knowledge in that 
way. To the extent that you take painkillers and you assume that they 
are going to work reliably in a certain kind of way is just to have 
accepted a certain body of scientific knowledge. A different step 
would be to say, “you know what, I am a bit uncertain about the 
claims that are made for aspirin, I am not so sure that aspirin really is 
a painkiller, I am going to run some tests!!” (laughs) And of course 
there are people who are sceptical about certain medicines—see all 
the stuff about vaccination—and the truly scientific answer to that 
scepticism is, well, run some tests then! Now, of course that is not 
easy to do, unless you are within the scientific establishment and 
you’ve got all the personnel and the equipment to do so. But the 
principle is what I am getting at. I am saying that it is one thing to 
accept, as most of us do in an everyday way, the deliverances of 
scientific knowledge, and it is another thing to go to naturalism 
301— where I actually get engaged in some tests of these elements of 
scientific knowledge, and investigate them for myself. And of course, 
we can’t all do that all of the time.  
 
3        Aesthetic Experience Triangulated  
 
AC: You endorse what you call a form of ‘Cooperative Naturalism’. 
Could you explain this position, and clarify how is it different from 
what you call ‘cherry-picking’?11 
 
11 See the discussion in Smith 2017a, pp. 1-3, which also considers ‘Autonomism’ (the 
view that the study of human behaviour should remain wholly independent of the 
study of the physical and non-human animal world) and ‘Replacement Naturalism’ 




MS: Let me start with the second concept and then work my way 
backwords to the first one. ‘Cherry-picking’ is just an everyday 
expression which I use to refer to academics in the humanities, 
including philosophers, who will draw upon or allude to scientific 
discoveries, but do so in an ad hoc, unsystematic fashion. They pick 
scientific cherries when it suits them to embellish and garnish some 
claim that they wish to make. I think a very good example of this is 
our friend Gilles Deleuze, less so actually in the books on cinema, but 
Deleuze’s work on mathematics was the subject of a major critique 
by the physicist Alan Sokal.12 So, Deleuze would be a good example. 
He will often appeal to some particular scientific insight or discovery, 
but without really any more general effort to think about how that 
discovery fits with his theory in general, how that particular piece of 
scientific research came out of a larger body of research. Another 
metaphor I use in my book is “the magpie theft”13 of scientific ideas. 
“Oh that’s a shiny looking thing, let’s grab that scientific claim and we 
can make something of this”, we can use it for rhetorical purposes. 
So, ‘cherry-picking’ is where a researcher from the humanities pays 
this kind of instrumental, short-term, very unsystematic attention to 
scientific discovery.  
Now that contrasts with what I am endorsing as the right way 
forwards, ‘Cooperative Naturalism’, where the idea is that if you are 
researching a question or a domain in the humanities, you should be 
alert to whether this research touches upon discoveries and 
knowledge which have been acquired in any other domain, and in 
particular—bearing in mind that naturalism says, “we tend to learn 
most about the world through those disciplines which have adopted 
a scientific method”—why not look to the sciences, to see if there is 
 
(the view that the study of human behaviour should, and in time will, be entirely 
subsumed by the natural sciences).   
12 Sokal & Bricmont 1998. See also Smith’s 2010 comments on the ‘Sokal Hoax’, 
triggered by Sokal 1996. 
13 Smith 2017a, p. 3. 
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anything relevant in those specific disciplines? So, much of the book, 
as you know, talks about various aspects of emotional response to 
film and to the arts, and that would be a very good example. If you 
were going to write about emotions in films, there are at least two 
other ways you could approach this, non-naturalistically. You could 
either say, we actually have a pretty rich everyday vocabulary for 
emotions—this is sometimes referred to as ‘folk psychology’—so we 
just stick with that, we just do an investigation of how emotions 
enter our experience and judgements of films, using nothing more 
than our folk psychology. And I think that that would take you a 
certain distance. That’s one possibility. Another one is that you might 
locate some arcane, possibly outdated, body of theory about the 
emotions, for example, a psychoanalytic one (laughs) … 
 
AC: (laughing) … just a random example …  
 
MS: … and you might say, yes, this looks kind of interesting, on its 
own terms. Let’s not worry too much about whether it holds up to 
empirical enquiry, testing, replication, and so forth; it just looks 
interesting, so let’s run with this, let’s use this as our model of what 
the emotions are and set it against a body of films and see where it 
takes us. I am not even saying that that approach has no potential 
value at all, but I am not sure how it has any knowledge-generating 
value. In other words, it may have a kind of aesthetic value, founded 
on its ingenuity. A lot of theory works in this way; it’s less about the 
degree to which the theory persuades you that it is insightfully and 
illuminatingly telling you things about some part of the world, or 
how the world works. Rather it is a thing unto itself. It’s a kind of 
invented world.  
 
AC: It would be, though, like building up a theory out of the claim 
that the earth is flat? 
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MS: Exactly. There is a kind of theorisation where, I think, really the 
kind of value that it’s seeking to fulfil has more to do with the 
inventiveness of the theoretician, irrespective of what it claims to be 
studying. But as soon as you hold such a theory up to a more 
empirical standard it doesn’t look very strong. Such work is more like 
aesthetic performance than empirical investigation. So again, to line 
up our options here: at the extremes we have autonomism, and 
replacement naturalism; and we have cherry-picking, which is just an 
opportunistic use of individual scientific discoveries. Then we’ve got 
what I’m endorsing, cooperative naturalism, which is an effort to 
assess systematically what one is trying to say about an aesthetic 
question against the backdrop of what is more generally known 
about human psychology.  
So, with all of that in the background, let us just think about 
what claims can be made for the kind of cooperative naturalism 
which I am endorsing. In effect, I am saying: “ok, let’s take our folk 
psychology, and put that alongside what various scientific disciplines 
are telling us about the nature of emotion”. And that is going to range 
over various types of psychology, for example, the very famous work 
conducted now over several decades by Paul Ekman and his 
associates about facial expression. 14  It’s going to include 
neuroscience, but also anthropology, and possibly parts of sociology, 
so there are social sciences which have an important role in this 
debate as well. But what we are trying to say is: let us see if we can get 
a more nuanced and deeper understanding of the way emotions 
work by pressing on beyond folk psychology into the kinds of things 
that have been discovered scientifically about the emotions. 
 
AC: Let’s turn our attention to aesthetics per se, and in particular to 
aesthetic experience. You define aesthetic experience as a particular 
kind of experience, one that is not merely had, but that is savoured.15 
So, aesthetic experience is characterised by, or perhaps is a type of, 
 
14 Ekman & Davidson 1994. 
15 Smith 2017a, p. 57. 
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self-consciousness. I would like to ask you if you could position your 
own definition within the wider debate on aesthetic experience in 
philosophical aesthetics. What kind of features make an experience 
aesthetic? This is a vexed question in the debate on aesthetic 
experience, since it is related to the unclear distinction between 
features of the experience itself and the features of the objects that 
elicit the experience. Does the naturalised account of aesthetic 
experience offer a solution to this quarrel?  
 
MS: Well, there are several things to say here. First off, I am 
committed to the idea that there is such a thing as ‘aesthetic 
experience’—that it isn’t a myth which ought to be eliminated from 
our theories. And second, leading on from this, I hold that aesthetic 
experience can’t be reduced to something more basic like attending 
to particular features of an object. In my view, we need an account 
which treats aesthetic experience as a distinctive, multi-layered, and 
complex experience. And yes, as you say, the self-consciousness of 
aesthetic experience is central to this complexity. This is also the 
foundation for the idea that aesthetic experience is something that 
matters to us, something that we value. After all, you can only 
‘savour’ something that you’re positively disposed towards! This third 
point isn’t one that I particularly stress in the book, but it is the focus 
of the project I’m now working on at Princeton.16 
As for whether a naturalistic approach can illuminate the 
nature of aesthetic experience: absolutely! I don’t take the view that 
consciousness in general, or aesthetic experience as a type of 
conscious experience, somehow eludes or transcends empirical 
investigation. As Daniel Dennett puts it, these phenomena are 
puzzles, but not mysteries. The primary idea in relation to this point 
 
16 This point is qualified by Smith 2019, p. 132 (‘Proust Wasn’t a Neuroscientist’), his 
contribution to ‘Is Psychology Relevant to Aesthetics?’, a symposium on both Smith 
2017a and Nanay 2016 (‘Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception’). The first fruits of 
Murray’s research project at Princeton will appear as ‘Human Flourishing, 
Philosophical Naturalism, and Aesthetic Value’, forthcoming in Corrigan 2020.   
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in ‘FACT’ is that we can get a much better grip on the idea of 
aesthetic experience—often cast in very abstract terms and 
consequently subject to scepticism—by drawing on psychological 
research on aspects of aesthetic experience or closely-related 
phenomena. Here I draw on work by Diana Raffman in relation to 
‘nuance ineffability’ in music perception, Jenefer Robinson’s 
extensive and rigorous engagement with scientific research on 
emotion, and Bence Nanay’s strategy of bringing ideas from 
perceptual psychology to bear on aesthetic experience.17 The idea is 
to soberly insist that aesthetic experience is no more and no less than 
another facet of human mental life. Moral psychology is widely 
regarded as an aspect of morality that can be studied empirically. 
Think of a naturalised approach to aesthetic experience as equivalent 
to that. In fact, a few years back Elisabeth Schellekens and Peter 
Goldie hosted a conference on ‘aesthetic psychology’ that issued in 
their edited book ‘The Aesthetic Mind’. Those enterprises are very 
much in the spirit of naturalised aesthetics.18 
 
AC: As you acknowledge, many believe that consciousness in general 
cannot be the subject of scientific study, nonetheless you hold that 
this specific sub-species of consciousness, the one involved in 
aesthetic experience, can be analysed with a scientific method. You 
propose to take into account three different levels of analysis we 
have at our disposal to study mental phenomena (the 
phenomenological level, the psychological level, and the 
neurophysiological level), and argue that we can ‘triangulate’ 
aesthetic experience. That is to say, you aim to explain aesthetic 
experience by bringing together evidence from different spheres of 
knowledge—an example of consilience, if I understand it properly. 
Can you sketch for us your account of a triangulated aesthetic 
experience?19 
 
17 Nanay 2016; Raffman 1993; Robinson 2005.  
18 Goldie & Schellekens 2011. 
19 Smith 2017a, pp. 57-82 
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MS: Triangulation is the idea that our best hope of understanding the 
human mind—and particular aspects of our mental life, like 
aesthetic experience—is to be open to the various kinds of evidence 
we have at our disposal: evidence from phenomenology 
(introspection, self-report), psychology, and neuroscience. So this is a 
kind of methodological pluralism, compared with approaches like 
hardcore functionalism (which holds that we have little to learn from 
neuroscience) and some varieties of phenomenology (which reject 
any empirical investigation of the mind). And yes, insofar as 
triangulation seeks to integrate these different types of evidence, it is 
indeed a form of consilience, characterized by William Whewell 
(who invented the idea) as the ‘jumping together’ of different bodies 
of evidence. 
The primary examples of triangulation at work in the book 
concern empathy and suspense. To take the case of suspense: 
suspense is a distinctive kind of affective state, and most of us think 
we can recognise it when we feel it. So, there’s our phenomenological 
evidence. There is also a well-established psychological account of 
suspense: on this theory, suspense arises when we don’t know how a 
story will turn out, and where we hope for a good outcome but fear a 
bad one. So, according to that theory, suspense won’t arise in 
situations where we know the outcome of a story—on repeat 
viewings, say, or films narrating well-known historical events. And 
yet the evidence of experience—of the phenomenology of watching 
such films—suggests that we do or at least can experience suspense 
in such contexts. That gives rise to the problem of ‘anomalous 
suspense’, the apparent experience of suspense where the orthodox 
theory says it shouldn’t arise.20  
This is where neuroscience comes into play: I argue that one 
way of adjudicating between what introspection tells us (“this feels 
like suspense!”) and what the psychological theory says (“sorry, it 
 
20 The problem of ‘anomalous suspense’ is explored in ibid., pp. 69-72. 
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can’t be suspense”) is to look at the neural correlates of suspense. If 
we find that the profile of brain activity for a subject engaging with a 
story in the classic suspense condition (that is, in ignorance of the 
story’s outcome) is identical in the relevant respects with the profile 
of a subject engaging with a story in the ‘no suspense’ condition (that 
is, knowing the story’s outcome), then we have reason to revise or 
reject the orthodox account of suspense, because we have a new 
source of evidence suggesting that suspense does or can arise even 
when we know a story’s outcome. By the same token, if those two 
profiles of brain activity look notably different, then we’ll have reason 
to think that our phenomenology is misleading, and that what’s 
going on in the ‘suspense’ and ‘no suspense’ conditions are really 
different. That shouldn’t surprise us; introspection is fallible. What 
also comes out from this example, then, is the idea that, although at 
the outset we take all three types of evidence seriously, further 
downstream in the process of triangulation, we may decide that a 
given piece of evidence is misleading or needs to be reinterpreted. 
This is where, so to speak, triangulation bares its teeth. 
 
4        Spectatorship 
 
AC: Before, while you talked about the history of the overall project 
behind ‘FACT’, you mentioned that in ‘Engaging Characters’ you 
were already using a naturalised approach to the study of film. Can 
you trace a sense of continuity between the two books? 
 
MS: Well, for one thing there is a good amount of continuity in terms 
of a focus on emotion. That is another reason to think about emotion 
as a compelling example of a phenomenon which seems to demand a 
naturalised or third-cultural approach. More specifically, both ‘EC’ 
and the new book are heavily concerned with emotional response to 
art in general, fiction as a sub-type of art, and film fiction as a sub-
sub-type. And there is a methodological connection: both are works 
of naturalistic theory or philosophy. ‘EC’ is a largely unself-conscious 
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piece of naturalistic theory, while the new book—and unfortunately 
it may not be better for it—is burdened with self-consciousness. 
That’s also one of the explicit goals of the new book—to reflect on 
the underlying principles that gave birth to the first book.  
 
AC: In ‘EC’, you deal with crucial psychological aspects that shape 
our aesthetic experience of film, but I also see a continuity in the way 
you treat spectatorship. In ‘EC’ (and in a couple of essays you 
published around that time—I refer to your debate with Richard 
Allen) 21 , you outline a new conception of spectatorship that 
significantly diverged from what had been the predominant theories 
in film studies, which saw spectatorship as an illusion or a dream-like 
experience. In contrast, your new conception underlines the role of 
consciousness in our experience of fiction. Can you sketch for us your 
account of spectatorship? How does it relate to the naturalised 
method you propose in ‘FACT’? 
 
MS: It is very important to remember that at the time of the genesis 
of that project there really was, and I think one can use this kind of 
language, a reigning view of film spectatorship, which was largely 
psychoanalytic in inspiration and in which the key term of art was 
‘subjection’. On this view, to be a spectator is to be subjected to the 
ideology of the film. In the most sophisticated versions of that theory, 
the ideological values of the film are manifested in the narrative and 
the visual structures of the film. What I’ve just given as a capsule 
description of the theory can be laid out with a great deal of nuance. 
But what I am trying to stress was central to that vision of 
spectatorship was the idea (you know the word ‘subjection’ says a 
lot) that individual human spectators are more subjects than 
agents.22 And spectators have very little flexibility of response, very 
 
21 Smith 1995b, 1998; Allen 1998.  
22 This contrast might be more precisely stated in terms of a contrast between 
‘patients’ and 'agents’, but Murray is adopting the language of contemporary film 
theory here. 
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little awareness of the nature of their response, very little ability to 
reflect upon the nature of their response, all of which simply seemed 
a caricature of the way, not just film spectatorship, but any kind of 
engagement with art, or any kind of human engagement with the 
world, works. 
So, you are absolutely right that, put at its simplest, the goal 
was to say: “Ok, let’s put two things back at the centre of our 
understanding of film spectatorship: one is agency; the other one is 
consciousness”. So, when we go to see films, we are acting in a certain 
way, and much of that agency takes an at least partially-conscious 
form. Now, that’s the broad thrust and the motivation for a new 
theory of spectatorship. That said, it is important to stress that in the 
alternative theory that I articulate, there is still a recognition that 
there are aspects of film spectatorship that have an involuntary 
character and over which we have no real control, so to speak, once 
we’ve made the decision to engage with a film. In relation to these 
aspects of film experience, we are passive recipients, being worked 
on by the film, rather than agents. I am thinking of things like the 
mere fact that we perceive motion; we have no control over that level 
of our physiology. But in my view, it would be crazy to regard that as 
somehow compromising our freedom. We have made a decision to 
engage with this experience—with the wonders of the moving 
image; it is not as if this has been imposed upon us. Another example 
of what I mean, in terms of the more passive aspects of spectatorship, 
would be reflex responses. This is something that the new book talks 
about a lot: that there is an aspect of our emotional response—low-
level startles, shocks, chills, shivers in the spine—which arises from 
the way in which films are engineered to work on us in a very directly 
causal fashion. The larger theory that I am putting forward insists, 
however, that this is just one dimension of film spectatorship. And 
we shouldn’t think of these visceral, more passive aspects of film 
spectatorship as somehow necessarily in tension with the more 
conscious, more intellectual, more reflective dimensions of film 
spectatorship, any more than we would think of those two things 
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being somehow in problematic tension with one another in our 
ordinary engagement with the world.  So, the fact that you are 
cooking dinner and you jump when you realise you’ve accidentally 
put your hand on the stove—that’s not in problematic tension with 
the fact that while you are cooking dinner you are also thinking 
about the lecture you are going to give tomorrow, or for that matter 
thinking about the recipe you’re using, right? Or maybe that crucial 
part of the puzzle in that final chapter of your dissertation finally gets 
worked out, as you are stirring the spaghetti sauce. What I am saying 
is: we are multileveled embodied agents. And that is true across all 
the domains that humans act and exist within.  
Now, there are various kinds of opponents I have here, not 
just one type of opponent. So, against the psychoanalytic school of 
thought regarding film spectatorship, I want to stress the cognitive, 
conscious, and reflective aspects of spectatorship, and say that 
however it is that we experience a movie as it unfolds—and that may 
include a lot of reflex behaviours over which we exercise very little 
immediate control—nevertheless in the longer run, and considering 
the experience as a whole, we are perfectly capable of reflecting on 
all of that. And of course, what else is a discipline like film studies if 
not systematic reflection on the nature of spectatorship? I am 
insisting that we only have things like film studies because of this 
capacity, a more basic capacity to reflect on our experiences. So 
against the psychoanalytic school of thought I am insisting on the 
active, cognitive and reflective aspects of spectatorship. But in the 
new book, another school of thought which I am equally opposed to 
downplays or denies altogether the involuntary, reflex aspects of film 
and aesthetic experience. My boogie man in the book is Raymond 
Tallis, so this is mostly in the chapter on neuroscience.23 Tallis, I 
should say, does not write about cinema—he generally writes about 
philosophical issues and to the extent that he writes about the arts it 
is mostly about literature. And there is a beautiful irony to this story 
 
23 Smith 2017a, pp. 82-105. 
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which I will come to in a moment. The key thing to emphasise is that 
Tallis objects to neuroscientific and evolutionary accounts of human 
experience because he thinks that such accounts reduce us to 
biological machines. Essentially, he thinks that neuroscientific and 
evolutionary explanations entirely wipe away any recognition of 
things like consciousness, our capacity to reflect, our capacity to 
understand the nature of our actions, and so forth. Now I just think 
that that is another kind of caricature, a caricature in the following 
sense: I am with Tallis in recognising that we have all of those 
capacities and that they are an important part of what makes us 
human; and these capacities are surely central to what separates us 
from most of the rest of the animal world. But the idea that you can 
really understand human behaviour, or the little slice of it that is 
watching movies, while disregarding things like reflex reaction and 
basic physiology—that strikes me as an equally reductive 
perspective. Do you see what I am saying?  
 
AC: Yes, but then how do you reconcile the fact that, as you’ve 
argued, aesthetic experience requires conscious reflection on the 
very kind of experience we are having (we ‘savour’ the experience, as 
you put it) with the idea that many of the mechanisms that are 
involved in our experience actually happen at the level of the sub-
personal and the cognitive unconscious?  
 
MS: The way I have been talking about it so far would lead you to 
think that the reflection I am referring to can happen only after the 
fact.  So you go watch your movie and while you are watching the 
movie you are jumping around in your seat as the shocks bear down 
upon you, and you are jamming in the popcorn and gulping down 
the sugared water … so you’re basically a bag of nerve-ends and 
reflexes and synaptic firing and there is nothing much going on 
beyond those physiological reactions. And then, after the fact, you 
are away from the heat of battle and you can reflect on the nature of 
the experience. Now clearly, that is part of the picture, in the sense 
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that I think that for any artform what happens when you are away 
from engaging with the work is a massively important thing. That is 
true for literature as much as it is for film. When you are attending to 
an artwork, you are not at the point in the process where you are 
reflecting on how you are experiencing whatever it is you are 
experiencing, or possibly learning from that work … that is, you are 
not, at that moment in the process, engaging in any kind of reflection 
on how the artwork might have implications for life itself. So, one 
thing that makes reflection on our experiences of artworks away 
from our engagement with them important, is that that’s when we 
think about and reflect upon how our experience of a work might 
have implications for the way we live our lives, how we learn things 
about the world, and so forth. But I also want to say that this happens 
to some degree in the experience itself. And this comes back to your 
question about reconciling the importance of the underpinning sub-
personal components of aesthetic response with the overall 
character of aesthetic experience, which, as you point out in your 
question, has this reflexive, self-conscious character where we not 
only experience a work but we savour our experience of the work. If 
such reflection just happened after the experience of the work, it 
would be a much weaker claim. So, I think that part of what is 
happening, certainly when you have a very powerful and 
rewarding—a successful—aesthetic experience, is that you are 
having it and you know you are having it, you know you are gripped 
by this. And part of that feeling of being gripped and compelled by a 
work of art is the recognition that “wow, this is really holding my 
attention, this is really fascinating”. But it is important to note that 
this state of self-consciousness represents the apex of aesthetic 
experience; I don’t mean to suggest that for something to count as an 
aesthetic experience, the second-order layer must be in evidence 
throughout the duration of the experience. For certain stretches of an 
aesthetic experience, and perhaps for the entirety of very simple 
aesthetic experiences, we may simply be engrossed in whatever the 
object offers up to our senses and imagination. In ‘FACT’ I say that 
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we savour, and don’t merely have, aesthetic experiences, when such 
experiences ‘go well’.24 So what I am really describing is a kind of 
ideal prototype or exemplar. 
Now this complex response—the reflexive, ‘double-ordered’ 
character of aesthetic experience—can cash out in a number of 
ways, depending on the individual work and the genre in which it is 
situated. Take horror, for example. As everyone in aesthetics knows, 
through Noël Carroll’s work especially, one of the many paradoxes 
we can talk about in the aesthetic domain is the paradox of horror—
which is a modern equivalent of an age-old problem, the paradox of 
tragedy—where the puzzle is: “how can we explain the fact that we 
seem to be attracted to something which on the face of it is 
something that repels us?”. It is in the nature of horror as ordinarily 
understood that it’s aversive, it’s something that we want to avoid. 
But, in the context of horror fictions, including horror movies, we (or 
at least those of us who are horror movie aficionados) seem to be 
actively attracted to this horrific subject matter. Now, part of what I 
am saying is that the reflexive character of aesthetic experience gives 
us a partial explanation of things like the paradox of horror, in the 
following way: that one stage of engaging with a horror movie for 
sure might involve those moments of repulsion and disgust and 
shock, moments where many of us are even going to turn our eyes 
away from the screen or at least wince. We are going to have 
emotional reactions which, considered locally, are unpleasant things 
to experience. But they are contained and framed within a larger 
kind of project of engaging with this work which—let us put it this 
way—we calculate, we gamble, will be a rewarding experience, as a 
whole experience. So that, if the experience of a horror movie was 
nothing other than a series of disgusting, horrific, localised shocks 
then it would be very hard to see a solution to the paradox of horror. 
 
24 Ibid. For more on the question of whether second-order ‘savouring’ is strictly 
necessary for an experience to count as aesthetic, see Paisley Livingston 2018, 
‘Questions about Aesthetic Experience’, and Murray’s 2018 response, pp. 71-5 and 
116-19. 
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But once we introduce into the argument the idea that there is a 
second-order dimension to our experience, a solution comes into 
view. We have first-order responses, including, in the case of horror, 
reactions of disgust and shock. But we also experience second-order 
responses, in which we reflect on the way our first-order responses to 
the film are unfolding, the way they are evolving. And that dimension 
of self-awareness is central to our ability to take pleasure and find 
something rewarding in things which are, at a first-order level, just 
repulsive. So, again to tie that back to your question, many of the 
first-order disgust reactions that I am referring to will have a sub-
personal character. They will just be working on some specific 
physiological mechanism. So, a certain kind of sound, or a certain 
kind of visual image just will generate a reaction of disgust from us, 
or a loud unexpected sound will trigger a ‘jump scare’, a startle 
response. So that is the sub-personal end of the experience. But that 
is not mutually exclusive with the reflective end of the experience.  
Let us put it this way: to be a human agent is to be this 
complex of different orders of response, from the very low-level 
physiological responses to the highest-level, most reflective, most 
integrated responses. In other words, I am not saying that any human 
agent is a perfectly consistent and integrated entity, but what I am 
saying is that there is a part of what it is to be a human agent which 
involves an attempt to make sense of oneself, as a consistent being.25 
And that is never complete, it is never perfect, but it is an ambition. It 
goes beyond aesthetics, but it is highly relevant to aesthetic 
experience, and that’s how I reconcile the sub-personal dimension 
with the conscious reflective character of aesthetic experience.  
 
AC: But then I have another question. 
 
MS: You mean I haven’t answered it perfectly? (laughs) 
 
 
25 On this point, see Smith 2017a, pp. 81-2. 
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AC: Let’s say that it was a perfect answer, but then we have another 
problem. You solve the paradox of horror by pointing at the reflective 
dimension of our aesthetic experience, yet, the paradox of fiction may 
pose a different challenge: how can fictional events and entities elicit 
actual emotions?26 After all, why are we moved, if we are conscious of 
the fact that we are attending to a fictional representation? In 
relation to the paradox of fiction one might even say that perhaps the 
illusion-based conceptions of spectatorship that you criticise may be 
in a better position to face the challenge posed by this paradox. 
According to illusion-based theories of spectatorship, our emotional 
responses to fictions could be explained either because we take a 
fiction to refer to real events and persons, or because we mistake the 
fictional representation for an actual event. Your view of 
spectatorship as a conscious experience needs to resort to different 
kinds of arguments to solve this paradox, for it implies that when we 
apprehend fiction films we never cease to attend to the fact that 
fiction films are representations built upon conventions. So, how do 
you solve the paradox?  
 
MS: The way I tend to see this is that there are essentially three kinds 
of solution that can be offered to the paradox of fiction. As you say, 
there is the suspension of disbelief solution, which essentially says 
that when we are in the heat of the moment, immersed in and 
engaged by the work of art—a film or another work of art—we 
actually lose awareness that it is merely a fiction. And as you are 
saying there are various different versions of this, but interestingly, 
this is generally regarded as the longest-standing attempted solution 
to the paradox of fiction; it goes back at least as far as the Romantics. 
The phrase ‘suspension of disbelief’ is from Coleridge and perhaps 
one can understand why historically it’s been a favoured solution, 
because it is very neat. It simply says, “ok, we can only have emotions 
when we take ourselves to be responding to something actually 
 
26 See Doran & Moser 2019, Willard 2019, and Robinson 2019 in this issue for an 
outline and discussion of the nature of the paradox of fiction. 
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happening, or to have happened at least”. So, if we just observe the 
way in which people become very absorbed in fictions, maybe we 
can say, within that frame, they’ve lost their ability to discriminate 
the real and the fictional. That’s one possible solution. The second 
possible solution is the one most famously articulated by Kendall 
Walton, which denies that the kind of affective responses we have to 
fictions are emotions in exactly the same sense as the emotions we 
experience in real contexts; rather, fictions prompt ‘quasi-
emotions’.27 The more I contemplate this question, the more I think 
that Walton’s ‘quasi-emotion’ solution may actually be the right 
solution.  
 
AC: So you think that we do not actually feel real emotions when we 
engage with fiction …  
 
MS: Yes, except that this is an easily misunderstood solution. It is 
very important to understand that Walton is not saying that the 
responses we have lack an affective character, that they cannot be 
intense, and that they do not in many respects resemble 
straightforward emotions. To come back to our horror example: 
when you are sitting there, gagging, bouncing around in your seat, 
shocked, appalled, weeping, or whatever your specific responses are, 
Walton is not saying that you are not deeply moved; he is making a 
very technical point about the difference between those responses 
and the very similar responses you would have, let us say, if you were 
on the edge of a motorway, and you were witnessing very similar 
scenes of actual carnage. In this context, the possibility of 
intervening in the scene would indeed be a real possibility. Walton’s 
position can easily be misunderstood to be saying that the affective 
responses we have to fictions are somehow weak, dilute, not very 
powerful; but the qualifier ‘quasi’, in the expression ‘quasi-emotion’, 
 
27 Walton 1978. 
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has nothing to do with the strength of the feeling. It has to do with 
the way the response relates to one’s beliefs. That’s the nub of it.  
Now let me run through the third kind of solution. This is the 
so-called ‘thought theory’, associated with Noël Carroll and Peter 
Lamarque.28 It points out that there are lots of contexts where we 
appear to have emotional reactions to things which we don’t believe 
to be taking place. And that is not unique just to our experience of 
fictions. So, we can contemplate things which might happen to us, 
and sometimes we might contemplate things which might plausibly 
happen to us. And contemplating things which might happen to us, 
actually helps us to plan. So, if you are a person of a very cautious 
sensibility, then contemplating what a period of unemployment 
would be like might guide your actions in a very different way to the 
way somebody who is much more inclined to risk-taking would find 
their actions steered if they imagined what it is like to be 
unemployed for a period. The imagination, the power of the 
imagination, is not something which is only narrowly pertinent to 
the arts. This is another way of stating a point that came up earlier in 
our discussion, when I was stressing that part of the perspective of 
the new book is to say: “look, aesthetic experience is distinctive, but 
it is not entirely disconnected from the rest of ordinary experience”. 
This is a very good example of that, right? We create fictions, which 
build on our capacity to imagine things, things which are not true of 
the world. But where does that capacity come from? Well it comes 
first of all from the fact that our minds are such that we can plan and 
anticipate, we can shape our future actions by delimited acts of the 
imagination representing possible future states. That is what 
planning is. So, fictions, in a grand way, work on the same basis.  
That, I think, all argues very much in favour of the thought 
theory of emotional response. And that theory is not something 
which Carroll invented just for the case of horror; it fits with a more 
general feature of our emotional life, that we do not just have 
emotions in response to events that have actually happened. We also 
 
28 Carroll 1990; Lamarque 1981.  
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have emotional responses to things which plausibly might happen, 
and we also sometimes have such responses to things which never 
will happen, or never could happen, and that is when emotions tend 
to be called phobias: when they become entirely irrational. So, I think 
that, coming back to your original question, about how the model of 
spectatorship in ‘EC’ copes with the paradox of fiction, when it looks 
like the old ‘illusion theory’ of spectatorship has the advantage of 
being much better prepared to solve the paradox of fiction, my 
answer is: well, there are at least two alternatives to the suspension of 
disbelief theory, both of which are better candidates. The one that is 
historically and—probably as I see it right now—my own favoured 
response is the ‘thought theory’ … 
 
AC: But you said the ‘make-believe theory’ before … 
MS: (laughs) I did, yes. 
 
AC: So, in the span of five minutes you changed your mind? (laughs) 
  
MS: Yes, in the span of five minutes (laughs) … No, let me clarify this. 
What I am saying is, I have always thought that the thought theory 
was the solution to the paradox of fiction, and it lines up best with 
the theory of spectatorship in ‘EC’ … but a few nights ago I read an 
essay by Stacie Friend (laughs), which was a defence of Walton’s 
theory of quasi-emotions, which made me think that maybe there is 
more to be said in defence of his account.29 
 
AC: Ok, so your reply to the paradox has changed over time? (Indeed, 
I did remember that you favoured the ‘thought theory’).  
 
MS: Well, in all honesty I would say that it always seemed to me that 
the thought theory and the ‘quasi-emotion theory’ are the leading 
 
29 Friend 2003. See also Friend’s 2018 critical commentary on Smith 2017a, Smith’s 
2018 response, especially p. 125, and note 51, p. 258, in Smith 2017a. 
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contenders because the suspension of disbelief theory just has too 
many costly and implausible implications.  
 
AC: But I would also like to ask you about the role of the 
physiological dimensions of emotions in the make-believe theory of 
emotion, because you stress the relevance and importance of the 
sub-personal and automatic reactions. Do they still play a role in the 
make-believe theory of emotion?  
 
MS: You are quite right that another part of my perspective is—and 
this connects with what I was saying a few minutes ago about the 
multileveled nature of human agency—that when we are watching a 
movie certain things are happening on a primal physiological level, 
where discriminations between what’s real and what’s merely a 
representation don’t come into it, at that level. So, if we are strictly 
talking about the sub-personal level, again, when you jump at a loud 
unexpected sound, your body reacts just as it would do if you were 
walking down the high street and a car backfires, or a firecracker goes 
off. It’s the same phenomenon. And your body goes: HUH! In both of 
those contexts, you exercise no deliberative control over those 
responses. By the way, the firecracker too is a kind of representation, 
even though it is also an actual explosion: a miniature, controlled 
explosion mimicking a larger, uncontrolled explosion. But whether 
it’s a movie explosion, a firecracker, or an actual explosion, which 
you may one day have the misfortune of witnessing, your body reacts 
in the same way to all three of those events. But of course, our 
reaction isn’t just at the bodily level. At the same moment that our 
body jumps, we also cognise what’s happening and a few 
milliseconds later, or certainly a few seconds later, we’ve already 
gotten a more sophisticated, conscious (and usually more accurate) 
understanding of what it is that’s happened to us. Combining this 
personal-level response with the lower-level, sub-personal reactions 
is an important part of what I term a ‘thick explanation’—one that 
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attempts to capture the various levels and layers of embodied, 
emotional, human cognition.30  
Let’s take the example of 3D experience. We go to see a 3D 
movie and it’s a strange experience for us; 3D is still a sufficiently new 
form of cinema that when you sit there and you put your glasses on, 
and these objects are floating around somewhere between you and 
the screen—it’s a weird visual experience. 3D experience in the 
movies has almost nothing to do with the three-dimensional 
experience that you and I are having right now—that is, our 
experience of navigating a three-dimensional spatial world. Actually, 
that picks up on another theme of the new book. The idea of 
expansionism. But we’ll come back to that … (phone starts ringing) … 
sorry that’s my wife calling but I am going to ignore her (laughs).  
 
AC: I will make a note of that … 
MS: Yes, you can keep that on record for posterity … So let’s return to 
the example of 3D experience. You are having this weird visual 
experience, which is not like any other visual experience you are 
likely to have outside a movie theatre. And you don’t really have an 
understanding of how on earth the technology is working on your 
perceptual system to create this bizarre set of sensations, this 
experience you are having. But at the same time that that is 
happening, you know full well that you have signed up and paid to 
have this 3D experience, and you’re watching yourself having this 
experience. That comes back to the self-conscious part of the 
aesthetic experience—the idea that we don’t merely have aesthetic 
experiences, but that we savour them. And I do not necessarily mean 
that at every moment you are having this second-order experience, 
but I am saying, globally, it is a feature of your experience with the 
film or work of art. You can think of it as an intermittent thing. 
During certain parts of the experience, you are just going to be 
focused on first-order visual or narrative experience. But there are 
 
30 On thick explanation, see Smith 2017a, pp. 51-4. 
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other moments when you will be having a second-order, more 
reflective kind of experience. 
Now let me connect this back to my discussion of the 
paradox of fiction. Here’s an idea which I’ll just float as a final 
hypothesis. One thing that differentiates the kind of emotional 
experience that we have when we are watching a movie from 
ordinary emotional experience is that it is partly characterised by a 
second-order, self-conscious dimension. Now that lines up pretty 
well with the make-believe emotion theory. So, when I am using my 
imagination to contemplate future possible courses of action and I 
am scaring myself with the thought that I might become 
unemployed, that doesn’t necessarily have a second-order dimension 
to it. The focus here is straightforwardly practical and action-
oriented: what am I going to do? Well, that’s a really scary thought, 
and I am not going to let that happen. I would rather work in 
McDonalds than be unemployed, some people might say, on the 
basis of such imaginings. So, the thought theory may not 
discriminate—or at least it may not discriminate very well—
between the kinds of emotional experience we have when we engage 
with artworks, and ordinary emotional experiences prompted by the 
kind of imagining characteristic of everyday planning. Whereas the 
quasi-emotion theory captures this difference. It’s also really 
important to remember that that is a small piece of Walton’s much 
bigger make-believe theory of the representational arts, and you have 
to look at it in the context of the more general theory to understand 
the strength of the quasi-emotion theory. In this context, it may be a 
more powerful theory than the thought theory.  
And there is a further, interesting difference in this respect: 
Walton is a system builder. He’s got this overarching, very detailed, 
very nuanced, very ambitious general theory of the representational 
arts. Carroll by contrast is a piecemeal theorist, he likes to bite one 
problem off at the time. I wouldn’t say that he disregards the 
systematic perspective, because, you know, the guy has written so 
much and so broadly of course there are connections in his overall 
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pattern of thinking. But what I am saying is that he is less concerned 
with how his answer to any one question connects with a set of 
related questions and coheres with them. That’s a methodological 
preference. But I think that a piecemeal perspective is an incomplete 
perspective; ultimately, as a theorist, you need to look at how all the 
‘pieces’ do or do not fit into a larger picture. Sellars’ adage again: how 
does it all hang together? Walton is really—programmatically—
interested in that. 
 
5        Film and/as Philosophy 
 
AC: With Tom Wartenberg, you have edited a special issue of ‘The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism’.31 The theme of the issue was 
film’s capacity to convey philosophical meaning or to philosophise. 
On that occasion, you published an essay where you sounded 
sceptical.32 More precisely, you argued that films cannot function like 
thought experiments because they prompt different kinds of 
imagination, related to their different purposes and contexts of 
appreciation. A thought experiment requires hypothetical imagining, 
where the possibility of some counterfactual is imagined in a spare 
and abstract way; whereas films require dramatic imagining, which 
involves elaborating and ramifying the bare counterfactual in one or 
more ways.33 Such a difference in the details we are required to 
imagine seems to point at the fact that a philosophical thought 
experiment and an artistic thought experiment are ‘geared toward 
different tasks’, or so you argued. In addition, you held that the 
relationship between narrative and argument was impressionistic 
and undertheorised, implying that narratives could not be taken to 
make philosophical arguments. Do you still stand by these 
 
31 Smith & Wartenberg 2006.  
32 Smith 2006a. 
33 The distinction is made by Moran 1994, pp. 105-6. 
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arguments, or has your position on the issue changed?34 In the same 
essay you say that there is a difference between knowledge in general 
and philosophical knowledge more specifically, but then can you 
clarify what is this philosophical knowledge?  
 
MS: I do think that there is a great deal of work out there which seeks 
to forge a very close tie between film (and art in general) and 
philosophy far too quickly; I am very sceptical of the most strident 
claims in this area. But I have tried to make sense of these arguments 
and the impulse behind them. I argue that the ‘film as philosophy’ 
thesis really amounts to a strong claim about the (potential) 
cognitive value of film—we can learn things by watching films, and 
perhaps learn from films in a unique way, specific to film. Few people 
would deny at least the first part of this claim—that we can gain 
knowledge by watching films—but by casting this in terms of films 
‘doing philosophy’, the ante is greatly upped. In my view, if we put it 
in these terms, we’re implying that the knowledge we can derive 
from films meets especially exalted standards, benefitting from the 
kind rigour and depth of reflection that we expect of philosophy. To 
my mind, that just mischaracterises the way most art works and what 
it seeks to achieve, in two senses. First, it tends to obscure the ways in 
which films and other types of art matter to us non-cognitively—that 
is, aesthetically—by furnishing us with what I refer to in ‘FACT’ as 
“adventures in perception, cognition, and emotion”; 35 complex, 
multimodal experiences which we value for their own sake, that is, 
independently of any further value they may have. This is the sense 
in which films are generally ‘geared toward different tasks’ than 
works of philosophy. And second, by assimilating films to the 
category of philosophy too quickly or too completely, we also 
mischaracterize the way in which they can be sources of knowledge. 
 
34 Both Smith and Wartenberg have pushed this debate further in a recent book 
edited by Katherine Thomson-Jones 2016. On a related topic, see also Smith 2017b.  
35 Murray does not use this exact wording in Smith 2017a, but the idea is discussed 
on pp. 138-141. 
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What films lack in argumentative rigour, empirical adequacy, and 
reflective maturity—the three marks of specifically philosophical 
knowledge—they make up for in terms of imaginative vividness and 
particularity.36  
Thinking about the relationship between film (as an art) and 
philosophy takes us back to the relationship between philosophy and 
science that we touched on earlier. This is a question of interest 
because one might think that a naturalised aesthetics is nothing 
more or other than a scientific, empirical aesthetics; that a 
naturalised aesthetics is one that is wholly absorbed into science. But 
that’s not my view. As in other areas of philosophy, while a 
naturalistic stance is one that aligns itself with the sciences, it’s not 
reducible to science in general or any particular science. I mentioned 
above three hallmarks of philosophical excellence: argumentative 
rigour, empirical adequacy, and reflective maturity. What marks out 
philosophy is its combination and self-conscious pursuit of these 
ideals. It’s not that these standards are entirely absent from the 
sciences, of course; but they do not combine to occupy centre stage 
as they do in philosophy. 
 
AC: To wrap up, a last question. Do you have any advice for young 
academics working in philosophy and/or film studies? 
MS: There’s an old Hollywood adage, usually attributed to John Ford, 
who said that he’d survived in the film industry by alternating films 
‘for the studio’ with more personal projects. Something like that 
applies to surviving in academia, I think. On the one hand, it’s very 
important to be intellectually honest, not least with oneself—to 
pursue the questions one finds important, and the answers one finds 
most plausible. On the other hand, it’s important to be aware of, and 
not get run over by, the realities of the environment in which one 
works, and that means everything from government and university 
 
36 Murray characterises philosophy and philosophical knowledge in these terms in 
‘Film, Philosophy, and the Varieties of Artistic Value’, his contribution to Thomson-
Jones 2016. 
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policies to the fads and fashions of academic disciplines. Somehow 
one has to balance strategic awareness of the opportunities and 
dangers which present themselves, with authenticity, truth to 
oneself. And, as the man said: it ain’t easy! 
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